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From Complex Bodies to a Theory of Art: Melancholy, Bodies, and Art in the Philosophy of Spinoza  
CHRISTOPHER THOMAS  
University of Aberdeen  
ABSTRACT: Spinoza's limited words on the subject of art has led many to claim that his philosophy is 
incompatible and even hostile to a theory of art. Such a critique begins by confusing modem 
aesthetic standards with Spinoza's actual words on art and its objects. Beginning with this confusion, 
this paper will argue that Spinoza's philosophy naturalises the work of art and conceives of things 
such as paintings and temples through his theory of complex bodies.  
Turning to the two places that Spinoza discuss art-HIP2Schol and IYP45Schol-this paper will argue 
that Spinoza understood works of art lo be particularly complex and hence powerful extended 
bodies with a use value relative to the striving of the human individual. Accordingly it will be argued 
that because Spinoza conceived works of art to be external bodies-artistic bodies-we should 
therefore begin to study art and its objects through Spinoza's relational theory of the individual.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
0f the elements that Spinoza's philosophy is said to lack perhaps the most significant is an aesthetic 
theory or philosophy of art. This paper will attempt to contribute to the theorisation of this 
neglected area by examining the few places that Spinoza directly references art. In the first section I 
will turn to two commentaries that address the place of art in the Spinozist philosophy. I will show 
that a critique of Spinoza's position on art from the basis of his 'rationalism' is to misunderstand the 
place of the imagination relative to the life of reason in Spinoza's ethical project. Following this I will 
begin to reassess Spinoza's philosophical position on art by turning to the two places in the Ethics in 
which he directly discusses architecture, painting, and 'other things of this kind.' Turning to 
11IP2Schol and IVP45Schol I will argue that Spinoza asks us to consider works of art as bodies and, 
more specifically, as complex bodies that result not from the free mind of an artist-genius, but solely 
from the complexity of extended substance. Furthermore I will argue that according to Spinoza such 
bodies have the capacity to overcome complex affects such as melancholy and, consequently, have a 
particular value for the complex body of the human individual. From these premises it will become 
clear that Spinoza does in fact give us two central principles for any theory of art: the relationship 
between artist and art object (IIIP2Schol), and the relationship between art object and perceiver 
(IVP45Schol). Finally I will suggest that by following Spinoza's understanding of art objects as 
complex bodies we can construct from his metaphysical and physical theory of individuation a 
relational model for theorising art that posits the art object as dynamic, active, and inextricably 
related to the socio-historical whole of which it is a constituent part.  
2. SPINOZA, ART, AND THE AESTHETIC 
Given the limited discussion of art in Spinoza's philosophy it has received scant attention in the 
secondary literature. Of the little that has been written, the extreme position argues that Spinoza's 
philosophy is hostile to art and that we should look away from his philosophy in order to think about 
art1 . This claim is made by James Morrison whose essay "Why Spinoza Had No Aesthetics" ( 1989) 
suffers from its reductive reading of Spinoza's epistemology. To quote: 
Herein lies, I believe, the ultimate basis of Spinoza's philosophical neglect of aesthetics. For once the 
good life is identified with the life of reason, and reason is opposed to emotion, imagination, and 
sense, art and beauty become suspect. (Morrison 1989: 363) 
According to Morrison Spinoza opposes the intellect to the imagination, reason to the senses, and 
such an opposition means that all that falls under the rubric of the imagination-and for Morrison this 
includes the objects and practices of art-is in direct contrast to, or impedes, the 'good life' 
considered as purely rational. But such an identification of the good life with the purely rational life 
is an equivalence rejected by many commentators of Spinoza's ethical philosophy. For example, 
according to the work of Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, the good life does not mean a life of 
pure rationality that is opposed to the imagination; the passive affects of the imagination are not in 
opposition to reason in the good life but, rather, they are continuous to one another. Here reason 
and imagination are understood to operate simultaneously with the former recognising the 
necessity of the latter in the inconsistent and changeable life of the human (Gatens and Lloyd 1999: 
50). That Morrison attempts to critique Spinoza's position on art on the basis of the latter's 
'rationalism' implies an anachronistic estimation of Spinoza's words on art. By reading into Spinoza's 
thought a modern aesthetic principle of art being opposed to the intellectual, Morrison points to 
Spinoza's emphasis on rational understanding in order to claim of art that, as a mode of the 
imagination, it must be an obstruction to Spinoza's intellectually driven ethics. By presupposing the 
anti-intellectual stance of certain modern aesthetic theories Morrison's thesis actively impedes any 
real engagement with what Spinoza actually says about art.  
As with the above criticism of Morrison, Moira Gatens in her "Spinoza on Goodness and Beauty and 
the Prophet and the Artist" similarly notes that measuring Spinoza's thoughts on art through post-
Spinozist aesthetic theories "risks foreclosing a consideration of the place of art in Spinoza's 
philosophy:' (Gatens 2015: 3; see also 13 ). Specifically, Gatens argues, such a confusion between art 
and the aesthetic restricts an understanding of the role that art might play in what she calls the 'art 
of living' or ars vivendi. Contrary to Morrison's view that as a mode of the imagination art is in 
opposition to the free life of reason, Gatens argues for the emancipatory function of certain 
'collective imaginaries!2 For Gatens, the artist, like Spinoza's theorisation of the prophet in the 
Theological-Political Treatise (TTP), has a 'superior natural ability to imagine' and it is from this 
special' creative talent' that she can create affecting images that become habitual in the collective 
imagination (Gatens 2015: 11).  
While Gatens's analysis correctly highlights the centrality of the imagination in Spinoza's philosophy, 
consequently rescuing the possibility of art contribut-ing to freedom from Morrison's claim that art 
obstructs freedom, I believe that her theorising of art through the artist-prophet is not the way that 
Spinoza most explicitly explains art. Indeed, nowhere in Spinoza's texts does he appeal to the mind 
or imagination of the artist in order to explain works of art. In what follows then, I will argue for a 
new reading of how Spinoza conceives of art by appealing to his metaphysical and physical 
theorisation of complex bodies. 
3. THE RELATION BETWEEN ARTIST AND ARTWORK:  
IIIP2SCHOL AND THE MATERIALITY OF ART  
There are two places in the Ethics3 that begin to explain and account for how art is produced, 
functions, and should be thought.4 The first occurs in IIIP2Schol where Spinoza takes as his starting 
point the proposition that: The body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot 
determine the body to motion, to rest, or to anything else. For Spinoza, there is no causal relation 
between the modes of each attribute, between mind and body, meaning that the mind cannot cause 
the body to motion and, likewise, the body cannot cause the mind to think. Because the body's 
motions cannot be explained from the causality of the mind, and the mind's ideas cannot be 
explained from the causality of the body, Spinoza reasons that each mode of each attribute must be 
explained solely through the attribute of which they are an expression. It is on this point that Spinoza 
takes art, and specifically architecture and painting, as a case in point to demonstrate his non-
standard mind-body thesis, to quote:  
They will say, of course, that it cannot happen that the causes of buildings, of paintings, and of 
things of this kind, which are made only by human skill, should be able to be deduced from the laws 
of Nature alone, insofar as it is considered to be only corporeal; nor would the human body be able 
to build a temple, if it were not determined and guided by the mind. (IIIP2Schol emphasis added) 
In this Scholium Spinoza is anticipating the objections to his claim that there is no causal connection 
between the modes of each attribute. They will say, he notes, that a painting cannot be explained 
without recourse to the mind of the painter. Such an objection refers us back to Spinoza's claim in 
Appendix One, the claim that in the most part people confuse causes taking first as final causes. In 
this instance the idea of the painting that is the cause of the mind's act of thinking is mistakenly 
taken to be the final cause of the body's act of making the painting. Such a position is man's primary 
prejudice for it is to see corporeal action as directed by an incorporeal will. Here, being ignorant of 
the infinite complexity of corporeal substance and of our necessarily determined nature as a body 
caused to action by an infinite causal chain of other bodies, we mistakenly conceive of our actions as 
arising freely from the power of our mind (Appendix One, IIP48). It follows, therefore, that given his 
strict denial of free will coupled with the denial of causal influence between mind and body, Spinoza 
must explain the objects of human artistry in a way that follows the conditions of his non-
hierarchical mind-body thesis.  
Focussing on works of art such as paintings and buildings Spinoza appeals to the body in order to 
explain the complexity of extended substance, stating of his critics that: "they do not know what the 
body can do, or what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone" (IIIP2Schol). 
According to Spinoza extension is no more or less complex than thought, and what can follow from 
the complexity of corporeal substance alone is not adequately known because we do not know what 
the body can do. Put differently, the complexity of the causal network of things considered through 
the attribute of extension alone is largely unknown to us. If we did have an adequate knowledge of 
the order and connec-tion of modes of extension we would not attempt to explain works of art via 
the activity of an individual directing mind, but would instead appeal to the infinitely complex causal 
activity of extended substance. 
And yet it must be made clear that while Spinoza's central point in IIIP2Schol is to deny that the mind 
directs the body in its motions, he is not falling back into the mind-body opposition that his famous 
parallelism thesis seeks to avoid. While Spinoza is clear that the material painting is not the result of 
a thought in the mind of the painter but merely the result of a series of causes in extension that 
stretches back to infinity, he would still hold that there exists an idea of the painting in the attribute 
of thought. Spinoza's parallelism doctrine of IIP7 affirms that just as the painting exists as a body in 
the attribute of extension so also it exists in the attribute of thought as an idea, and both have a 
causal history that are identical to one another. The assertion of IIIP2Schol is then not to deny the 
place of ideas in the creative genesis of works of art. Rather it simply aims to redress our skewed 
Cartesian mind-set that posits the complexity of the mind over and above that of the body, and then 
to conceive the mind as the driving force of corporeal action and artistic production. In this way 
Spinoza's focus on the mate-rial expression of the art object and his use of artistic production as an 
example of matter's complex self-modification seeks to emphasise the equal complexity of both 
mind and body and their like expression of the activity of the same one thing. Once more, Spinoza's 
aim is to right the misconception of matter's inferior complexity to thought, an idea that has 
classically led to the belief that it is the 'genius' mind of an individual artist that is the cause of a 
work of art.5  
Here, then, Spinoza is making two points: firstly that it is not the mind that manipulates matter but 
matter's activity itself that causes its modifications; and secondly that the cause of matter's affected 
states, i.e., this or that building or painting, cannot be located in the causally isolated actions of an 
autonomous individual even if we consider that individual's actions under the attribute extension 
alone. Hence as well as denying the mind's power over the body, Spinoza's intention in JIIP2Schol is 
also to disperse the autonomous power of the individual into an active causal network, therefore 
positing the artist's individual creativity as the activity of extended substance itself. In this way 
Spinoza emphasises that the causal network of material things is complex enough to give rise to 
paintings and buildings without either a mind guiding its activity or the intervention of a human 
'genius' that somehow acts from outside of nature's necessity. At this point we see Spinoza's 
contention most clearly: The work of art arises from the necessity of nature's activity and, whether 
considered under the attribute of thought or the attribute extension, both its idea and its body 
cannot be traced back to any single finite cause abstracted from the causal activity of the rest of 
nature, but must in-stead be understood to follow from the infinite complexity of substance's 
activity.  
For Spinoza then it is no more the artist herself that produces the work of art than all the previous 
causal relations she underwent. Indeed Spinoza is not alone in thinking of the creative act as 
dispersed amongst a matrix of relations. To take an example from literature compare here Virginia 
Woolf in A Room of One’s Own: 
For masterpieces are not single and solitary births; they are the outcome of many years of thinking 
in common, of thinking by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the 
single voice. (Woolf 2000: 66) 
Woolf's contention that the work of George Eliot or the Brontës is the outcome of the experience of 
'the body of the people' gives us a modern parallel through which to illuminate Spinoza's 
'democratic' conception of artistic creation. There is nothing 'solitary' to the work of art, and 
Spinoza's contention that it is the activ-ity of extended substance, understood as the totality of 
material relations, that gives rise to the work of art, will only surprise us if we underestimate the 
extent of nature's complexity.  
The model for explaining art objects that IIIP2Schol puts forth and that Woolf illuminates follows 
Spinoza's naturalistic philosophy, precluding any onto-logical or epistemological distinction of works 
of art and instead explains them "from the laws of nature alone, insofar as it is considered to be only 
corporeal:' (IIIP2Schol). It is in this Scholium that we first begin to discern a theory of art in Spinoza: 
Works of art such as paintings and temples arc here considered as physical bodies brought to 
existence through entirely physical causes and, as such, should be explained solely through this 
infinite network of physical causality insofar as it is understood to express the activity of extended 
substance. But as well as this, IIIP2Schol also makes a claim regarding how we should consider the 
position of the artist relative to the creative act. Artworks such as paintings and temples are 
considered from the complexity of substance's activity and are not the result of the controlling mind 
of a 'genius; as in certain aesthetic theories of the modern period. In sum then lllP2Schol touches 
upon two central issues in any theory of art. Firstly it tells us how artworks are produced, and 
secondly it sets out a method for how they can be explained, and both amount to the same thing: As 
expressed in the attribute of extension artworks are created through a certain causal mechanism of 
bodies, and it is through this causal history and not through the isolated causal power of the artist 
that we can begin to explain and understand works of art.  
4. THE RELATION BETWEEN ARTWORK AND SPECTATOR: 
IVP 4 5SCHOL AND THE ARTISTIC BODY  
The second place where Spinoza discusses art is the Scholium to Proposition 45 of Book IV. In what 
follows I will expand upon the various claims of this Scholium whilst continuing to situate its 
argument in Spinoza's wider philosophy. 
The principal section of concern is as follows:  
It is the part of the wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with 
pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music. sports, 
the theatre, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. For the 
human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require new 
and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can 
follow from its nature, and hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding 
many things at once. (IVP45Schol) 
Referring to this Scholium, Morrison states that Spinoza affords the arts only a limited medicinal 
value and that they have no intrinsic worth (Morrison 1989: 361-2). He is correct. It is clear that for 
Spinoza the objects and practices of art, like all things in his philosophy, do not have any value in 
themselves. They are not autonomous things that are exceptional in nature, for such a position 
would run counter to the foundations of his natural philosophy.6 Rather, works of art follow the 
conditions of Spinoza's metaphysics and are here theorised in relation to their utility for another 
body, i.e., via their usefulness in relation to the striving of the wise man. Indeed it is entirely 
misguided to critique Spinoza's notion of art objects via their Jack of intrinsic value, for in Spinoza's 
philosophy nothing has value of itself. Spinoza is clear on this, specifically noting of music: 
 For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. 
For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither 
good nor bad to one who is deaf. (IV Preface) 
Any intrinsic value that a work of art might traditionally be said to contain is here categorically 
denied. A piece of music only attains a value relative to a particular power to strive and a particular 
time and place. Thus for the melancholic music will be good because it will ease their melancholy, 
while for the mourner it will most often be bad for it will only deepen their sadness (see also 
IVP59Alt-Dem). Works of art, then, should not be measured by what intrinsic value they might 
traditionally be said to have. Rather, it is through the extrinsic value that they attain relative to a 
particular individual and its power to strive that we should begin to understand them. To measure 
art via its use-value immediately puts Spinoza at odds with various modern aesthetic theories that 
entirely remove the concept of utility from the experience of art.7 And yet just because art is 
opposed to utility in certain modern theories of art this does not mean that Spinoza deflates the 
value of art and belittles its particular contribution to human life. Spinoza's naturalism is not 'hostile' 
to art because it fails to afford its objects an objective, supernatural value; instead it asks us to think 
about a work of art as an active part of nature, as a body that is entirely natural and whose 
particular value varies according to the changing affective relations that it enters into.  
This naturalisation of the art object follows Spinoza's wider philosophico-anthropological project of 
realigning man with Nature, a project that is also evident in his treatment of Holy Scripture in the 
Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). In chapters 7-12 of the TTP, Spinoza argues that an object's 
sanctity is not connected to some objective or supernatural value that it contains but is rather 
determined by how its body is used by a people (TTP 165).8 As Warren Montag notes, for Spinoza, 
Scripture must be understood through its material presence and its value measured like any other 
body in nature, that is to say, through the effects it produces as a body among many other bodies 
(Montag 1999: 5). As well as his more explicit project of reducing humanity to a mere part of Nature, 
Spinoza's naturalisation of humanity's products -Scripture and the work of art respectively - is an 
equally important aspect to his wider ethical and political project. Just as humanity has often been 
posited through a Cartesian lens as a dominion within a dominion that disrupts rather than follows 
the necessity of nature (III App), so humanity's products such as societies, the Holy Scriptures, and 
art, are also often thought in opposition to the natural and therefore must undergo the same 
critique that Spinoza affords human action in the Ethics.9 In this way Spinoza's project of realigning 
both humanity and its products with Nature's necessity can be seen as a crucial part of his wider 
ethical and political philosophy.  
It follows from the above then that because Spinoza conceives works of art through their affective 
relation to the human body it would be most accurate if we no longer spoke of works of art but, 
rather, of bodies of art. Put differently in the Spinozist philosophy we should begin to theorise works 
of art such as paintings and temples in the manner of artistic bodies, here understood as external 
bodies with a particular and changeable use-value that is always relative to a spectator and their 
power to strive at a given time and place.  
4.1 Melancholy and Art  
That Spinoza naturalises the work of art has been demonstrated through IIIP2Schol and IVP45Schol 
respectively. But insofar as works of art are to be con-sidered in this way exactly what degree of 
power artistic bodies contain, insofar as all bodies are individuated by a particular degree of power 
(JP36Dem), has not yet been shown. In the following I will go on to argue that Spinoza conceives 
artistic bodies to be particularly complex (and hence powerful and active) in the sense that he uses 
the term in his theory of the individual.  
IVP45Schol sits within the part of the Ethics that deals with humanity's bond-age to the affects. 
Given the necessarily embodied condition of humans they will always be subject to external causes, 
which is to say, they will always be subject to affects (IVP3-4). For Spinoza there are three primary 
affects-joy, sadness, and desire-and an infinite variation of affects that derive from these principal 
affects:" There are as many species joy, sadness, and desire, .. as there are species of the objects by 
which we are affected" (IIIPS6). In 1VP45Schol Spinoza aims to show that although the variation of 
affects that follow from the primary affects are often subject to classification in cultures, such a 
classification is merely a confused understanding of the primary affect from which they derive. Thus 
we hear Spinoza state: 
 Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more proper 
to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy? (IVP45Schol, emphasis added) 
Whether the affect of hunger or the affect of melancholy, both relate to a diminution in our body's 
ability to act for both are modifications of the primary affect sadness. Put differently, those who 
forbid pleasure are those who do not understand the nature of the affects and who confuse natural 
desires with images or universal values. Hence the superstitious that arbitrarily forbid certain species 
of one and the same affect are merely confusing the cultural imaginary of, say, pleasure, as 
something other than a modification of the affect joy. According to Spinoza then, insofar as both 
melancholy and hunger are species of one and the same affect both equally require of the affected 
individual that she strive to overcome them so that she might flourish.  
But even though every species of the primary affects of joy or sadness all have the same end (an 
increase or decrease in an individual's power), this does not mean that they can all be countered ( or 
induced) by the same means. For Spinoza different affects require different affective offsets. In the 
case of the affect hunger the affected individual requires the external bodies of various foodstuffs so 
that it might be regenerated and maintained. Such simple external bodies as foodstuffs are here 
understood as specific to the overcoming of the affect hunger and not, say, to the overcoming of the 
affect disdain. But while such bodies as foodstuffs are effective in relation to hunger, Spinoza will go 
on to argue that in the case of more complex affects such as melancholy, the affected individual will 
require increasingly complex external bodies in order to overcome it, and such bodies, it will be 
shown, can arise through the particular activities of artists, musicians, and dramatists (IVP45Schol).  
Of the eight times that the affect melancholy is mentioned in the Ethics and TTP, four times it is 
given in relation to art and culture.10 This is not an arbitrary connection, for when Spinoza states in 
IV Preface that: "music is good for one who is melancholy;' he is affirming a well known historical 
connection between melancholy and its cure in music and the arts. Indeed we know that Spinoza 
himself was aware of this historical collection for in his chapter on prophecy in the TTP he recites the 
Old Testament story of David playing the harp to ease the melancholy of King Saul (TTP 22). But why, 
beyond historical conformity, does Spinoza connect melancholy to art, specifically noting the latter's 
ability to overcome the former? In the following I will demonstrate Spinoza's linking of melancholy 
to art by showing how in IVP45Schol Spinoza uses his theory of the complex individual11 in order to 
make their association. 
4.2 Complex Bodies and Complex Affects  
Here I want to return to the previously quoted IVP45Schol: 
 It is the part of the wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation with 
pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with decoration, music, sports, 
the theatre, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use without injury to another. For the 
human body is composed of a great many parts of different natures, which constantly require new 
and varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of all the things which can 
follow from its nature, and hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding 
many things at once. (IVP45Schol) 
There are two parts to this citation. The first part appeals to the necessity of artistic bodies to 
restore the wise, while the second part demonstrates this need by appealing to the complexity of 
human individuals. Why does Spinoza demonstrate the necessity of art by appealing to the 
composite nature of the wise man's body? To answer this we must first discern the key points of 
Spinoza's theory of the individual.  
Spinoza's theory of the individual is most explicitly worked out in the Physical Digression but it is 
often also cached out in relation to his 1665 letter to Henry Oldenburg (Ep32).12 The Definition of the 
individual in the Physical Digression states that an individual comes to be, either (i) when a number 
of bodies are determined to lie upon one another to create one composite body, or (ii) when a 
number of bodies enter into a certain fixed relation of motion and rest so that they all compose one 
complex body or individual. Focussing on the latter definition (for Spinoza confirms this to be the 
definition of the human individual in IVP39), this means that individuals are distinguished from one 
another not by substance, form, or function, but by the fixed ratio of motion and rest that 
determines their composite parts to union.13 Furthermore HL7Schol and Ep32 tell us that complex 
bodies or individuals are things whose constituent bodies are complex bodies in themselves, each 
being composed of perhaps more complex bodies and each with their own corresponding nature. 
The more complex a body the more its constituent bodies are complex in themselves, and such an 
order is true of human as well as non-human individuals.14 However the specifics of what makes a 
body complex is not the number of bodies a thing is composed of, for such a numerical atomisation 
of the individual is rejected by Spinoza (see IP l 5ScholIV). Rather, a body is increasingly complex the 
more it can affect and be affected, and such an ability is determined by the diversity of bodies that it 
contains as a constituent. In this way a person can affect and be affected in as many ways as their 
body is complex and in as many ways as their constituent bodies allow them to affect and be 
affected in different ways ( II Post.III, IJP l 3Schol).15  While this means that a person can be more 
affective and therefore more active because of the greater variation of their constituent bodies, it 
also means that a complex individual will be more susceptible to negative affects and the diminution 
of power that follows. A rock, for instance, has a low capacity to be active and a low capacity to be 
affected for its body's constituent parts have little variation and, therefore, regardless of how many 
constituent bodies it might contain ( we might scale the rock up to be a boulder, for instance), it will 
always be limited in the ways it can enter into rela-tions with external bodies. Because of its lack of 
bodily variation the rock cannot act upon the world in certain ways but, likewise, it is also insulated 
from being acted upon in certain ways. Given its limited complexity the rock cannot suffer the 
affects of hate, fear, or remorse, affects that in another individual might lead to a diminution in their 
power. However contrary to the rock's resistance to such negative affects, the human individual 
whose body is composed of a multiplic-ity of varying bodies and who can be affected in a great many 
ways relative to its complexity, will suffer a loss of power at the impressions of such affects. This 
means that while variation in composition makes bodies more complex and hence more powerful 
and active, it also has the negative consequence of opening them up to many destructive and 
increasingly complex affects that could have a negative impact on an individual's power.16 
It follows then that a thing is more complex not only by the amount of bodies it contains but also by 
the breadth in variation of its constituent bodies. Such complex bodies are, by virtue of their various 
natures, at once increasingly affec-tive but also more susceptible to being affected and, specifically, 
to being affected by complex affects. By "complex affects" I here understand affects such as 
melancholy and cheerfulness that have the power to affect all of an individual's varying constituent 
bodies at once (Il1P I I Schol). The determination of melancholy as complex is significant for it means 
that, as bodies with the capacity to overcome melancholy, works of art such as music and theatre 
must be of an equal or greater power to melancholy itself. It follows that Spinoza's coupling of 
melancholy with artistic bodies implies the complexity of the latter, thus affording a definition of the 
artistic body as fundamentally complex in the sense of the term that we have elaborated upon 
above. To quote Spinoza's definition of melancholy we will see it given as a particularly complex and 
hence powerful affect: 
 The affect of joy which is related to the mind and body at once I call pleasure or cheerfulness, 
and that of sadness, pain or melancholy.  
But it should be noted [NS: here) that pleasure and pain are ascribed to a man when one part of him 
is affected more than the rest, whereas cheerfulness and melancholy are ascribed to him when all 
are equally affected. (IIIP ll Schol; italics in original, boldface emphasis added) 
Melancholy is contrasted to pain as an affect that is not limited to any one part of the body but 
affects all the parts of an individual equally. It is in this sense that melancholy, alongside its antonym 
cheerfulness, is considered a complex affect. According to Michael Lebuffe melancholy and 
cheerfulness provide a real problem for Spinoza because they appear to be always had or good in 
themselves. As Lebuffe notes (2009: 2 I 6-8), a passive affect can be good and cause an increase in a 
person's ability to act insofar as it takes away a greater evil. Melancholy and cheerfulness, however, 
because they affect all the parts of the body equally leaving no part unaffected, appear to be good 
or bad without regard to circumstance. Put differently melancholy and cheerfulness appear to be 
good or bad in themselves, a claim that contradicts Spinoza's ethical relativism but which at the 
same time highlights the particularly powerful nature that Spinoza understood melancholy to have.17 
While IVP45Schol states that melancholy and hunger are both equally nec-essary to be overcome, it 
is nevertheless the former that requires particularly powerful bodies in order to achieve this. Music 
and works of art in general are correlated to melancholy for they are understood to have a particular 
kind of complex body that, like the affect melancholy, has the capacity to affect all the various parts 
of an individual at once. Thus Spinoza maintains that music is good for one who is melancholy 
precisely because a piece of music is understood as an external body with a degree of power equal 
or greater to that of the complex affect of melancholy. This is not so hard to conceive empirically, 
think of the all-encompassing power of a poem or musical performance to overwhelm and render 
inanimate the body with its affectivity. For the duration of the poem or musical performance the 
perceiver's own body is entirely subject to the movements of the words or the repetition of a certain 
refrain; the reading and listening body is thus rendered inert through the power of the artistic body 
and its capacity, like melancholy, to affect all the parts of our composite body at once. Here then, 
complex artistic bodies are understood in the same way as the composite bod-ies of Spinoza's 
theory of the individual. Artistic bodies such as music appear complex in virtue of their being 
composed of many varying bodies, and because of their ability to affect all the constituent bodies of 
the listening individual at once. It is for these reasons that Spinoza considers artistic bodies to be 
complex insofar as they are able to counter the complex affect of melancholy that the human 
individual suffers.  
5. TOWARDS A SPINOZIAN THEORY OF ART 
But what is it to say of artistic bodies that they are to be understood in the same way Spinoza 
theorises individuals and complex bodies? What are the implications of such a seemingly reductive 
theory of art? Before moving on to these concluding questions I would first like to anticipate an 
objection to the argument presented so far. The objection might run so: If it follows from the details 
of Spinoza's ontology that artistic bodies cannot be really distinguished from other non-artistic 
bodies, then how are we able to differentiate what is art from what is not? The answer to this 
problem lies in what Spinoza notes of Scripture in the TTP but given the limitations of this paper I 
can only detail the argument in brief.  
Placing himself on the side of historicist theories of art Spinoza might maintain that artistic bodies 
are determined as artistic bodies historically. Just as Scripture is sanctified as Scripture, and not just 
any other 'inarticulate object' (TTP 164), both historically and socially through its use amongst a 
people, so too might certain bodies be determined as bodies of art. In sections five and six of 
Chapter Twelve of the TTP Spinoza offers an account of the sanctity of Scripture detailing the 
reasons for why a particular body of text is understood as sacred and how its sanctity makes it 
distinct from other non-sacred bodies of text. According to Spinoza that which is called sacred is 
legitimated in its sanctity by its use as a religious object. Thus, Spinoza notes, there is nothing 
inherently sacred about the tablets of Moses, but their sanctity is connected to their use as objects 
of worship, to their determination as sacred by a people's actions and collective imagination. But, as 
Spinoza notes in the Ethics, affects and their communication between a people is something that is 
inconsistent and changeable. At one time the tablets of Moses were sacred because they had 
inscribed upon them the covenant that bound the Jews to God. But another time the historical 
conditions of the Jews changed and they began to worship the golden calf, thus neglecting the 
tablets and negating their legitimacy as sacred in doing so. Here, Scripture is determined as Scripture 
in history: it is the material conditions of a people and the affects that circulate between them that 
determine this or that body of text with sanctity or this or that word with a particular meaning. Just 
as with Scripture, for Spinoza art and its bodies might be legitimated as art in a similar way, and 
while this latter conjecture is speculative, it is nevertheless based on what Spinoza notes of the 
letter of Scripture and his determination of the artistic body as a particularly complex and affective 
body.19  
Prior to addressing the above objection I had argued that artistic bodies are to be considered as 
complex bodies and therefore are composed of an increasingly complex nesting of bodies within 
bodies. Further, such complex artistic bodies were understood to be particularly powerful, for they 
were correlated to the affect melancholy and given as bodies that have the ability to affect all the 
constituent bodies of an individual at once. But in order to further develop the implications of 
conceiving works of art as complex bodies we must once again turn to Spinoza's theory of the 
individual and, specifically, to the recent research around the relationality of the Spinozist individual.  
According to several recent commentators Spinoza's theory of the individual is fundamentally 
relational and follows from his 'ontology of power' (Laerke 2009: 181). Various methods have been 
used and various terms have been invented to describe the dynamic nature of the Spinozist 
individual. Etienne Bali bar uses the theory of 'communication' and the term 'transindividuality' to 
think the process of individuation and its political ramifications; Aurelia Armstrong employs the 
feminist literature of 'relational autonomy' to think the autonomy of the Spinozist individual; and 
Caroline Williams theorises a new kind of subjectivity in Spinoza coining the idea of a 'subjectivity 
without the subject.20 At the starting point of each of these theses is Spinoza's reworking of the 
individualist-holist binary and the particular relation that Spinoza conceives individuals to have to 
the totality of which they are a part. While an individual is defined in the Physical Digression via its 
essence as a certain fixed ratio of motion and rest between its parts, Ep32 presents the individual in 
a different light by defining it existentially as a part in relation to an always more inclusive whole. In 
Ep32 the individual is given as necessarily situated amongst a multiplicity of other finite modes. By 
limiting one another's indefinite power to strive (IIIP8) individuals come to be determinate and 
durational through the bodies that limit them. Put differently, this or that finite mode is individuated 
through the external relations they have.21 As well as this Spinoza is clear that "The human body, to 
be preserved, requires a great many other bodies by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated" 
(Tip 13PostulateIV). This means that although the Spinozist individual is defined in the first instance 
by its particular conatus or actual essence, this essential power to strive could not be maintained 
without certain relations with external bodies.22 In this way an individual cannot be abstracted from 
the network of causal relations that constitutes its individuation. Here the individual and the 
external environ-ment that both cause it to existence and then sustain it in existence are seen as 
inextricably related, meaning that when thinking this or that individual we are likewise thinking the 
milieu in which that individual is situated.23  
Because an individual's individuality is so closely related to the relations it undergoes with the bodies 
that surround it, it follows that a body's delimiting boundary cannot be known by its phenomenal 
appearance alone. Spinoza is clear in the Physical Digression that the parts of an individual may be 
entirely replaced and its figure completely alter while the individual nevertheless remains. As Hans 
Jonas has noted, the most accurate analogy for thinking the Spinozist individual would be that of a 
flame. The flame's permanence as an identifiable individual is not an identity of fixed and immutable 
substance. Rather, the flame, like the Spinozist individual, should be conceived as a perpetual 
process of mutual affec-tivity with external bodies that perpetually constitute and reconstitute it 
(Jonas 1973: 265). There is no substantial individual around which affects and relations emanate but, 
rather, the individual is the affects and relations it undergoes and as such can only be distinguished 
as this or that individual by the effects it produces as an active cause. 
 How then to think this processual concept of the individual in terms of the artistic body? A 
historical painting or contemporary piece of music are both art-works composed of many varying 
bodies, such as the various physical materials that a work of art might be composed of. The mutual 
relation of each individual artwork's bodies expresses the whole work of art whose ability to affect, 
due to its composition as a complex body, is rarely exhausted. At this particular time one is affected 
by a composition of a certain set of constituent bodies, such as a particular composition of this 
colour and that image, this refrain and that tone; and another time a new composition of its 
constituent bodies might emerge and elicit an entirely different affective response (see IIIPSl). This 
emergence of ever-changing affective relations is the active encounter that a human body might 
have with an artistic body. Given the complexity of each body and the continuously changing 
existential circumstances in which they relate, the affective composition that human and artistic 
body might enter into is never the same. For this reason the particularity of the artistic body, 
measured as it is by the various effects it has on the world, will continuously vary according to the 
differing rela-tions it undergoes and according to the various spatiotemporal circumstances it is 
experienced under. Here we might point to the variation of affects produced by a well known artistic 
body across time and in different places. Defined by the affects it produces. Pablo Picasso’s anti-war 
painting Guernica will be constituted in its individuality in a different way by a person in Spain 
immediately after the Second World War, than by a person in Britain in the twenty-first century. The 
painting will retain its individuality across this spatio-temporal divide but, like the flame's continuous 
process of reconstitution, its individuality will be constituted anew by the differing relations it effects 
with external bodies.  
In a movement of reciprocal-determination the Spinozist encounter with a work of art is a 
transformative experience for both artwork and perceiver. Michael Mack comes close to a Spinozist 
conception of art as relational when he argues that literature functions to alter the normative and 
fictive ways of living that condition our everyday lives.24 Challenging .fictions such as Humanity, 
Good, Evil, Beauty, and Ugliness, literature and art seek to reveal these images and re-align our body 
anew to the whole in which it partakes. This, according to Mack, is the ethics of literature (Mack 
2014: 54). But while Mack posits the relationality of literature as a movement from artwork to 
perceiver, he does not fully follow Spinoza's conception of individuation and make the movement 
reciprocal. As well as human individuals being disposed in different ways by artistic bodies, so too 
are artistic bodies disposed by the relations they effect. In this way the Spinozist understanding of 
the work of art is closer to Umberto Eco's concept of the modern work of art as 'open’. For Eco the 
work of art is 'open' in the sense that it is in a constant and continual process of completion by the 
perceiver; indeed according to Eco the nature of works of art is such that they actively seek out 
participation in their being (Eco 1989: 85).25 For Eco, then, not only are works of art relational and 
open but they also actively seek out relations, thus opening themselves up to a continuous process 
of determination from external bodies.  
Here then the work of art appears as relational because it is constituted in its being through the 
relations its body effects. This means that as a site of relation the individuality of an artistic body is 
never static but is continually modified by the multiple relations it stimulates; in Eco's terms the 
work of art appears as fundamentally 'open' and in a continual process of completion by the 
perceiver that relates to the work. In this way Spinoza's philosophy requires that we take artistic 
bodies in their dynamic individuality and explain them through the relations they effect at a 
particular time and in a particular place. This method for explaining and thinking about art objects is 
a particularly nominalist theory and requires that each time we encounter a body of art we consider 
it anew based on the relations it stimulates and the effects it produces. The modern idea of a 
critique of taste that subjects works of art to a judgment of universality could not be further from 
the Spinozist model for thinking art. If it is against the backdrop of this modern model of aesthetics 
that we evaluate the place of art in Spinoza's philosophy, then his philosophy will ultimately appear 
hostile to art and its theorisation. However if we take him on his own words and think works of art 
via their existence as complex bodies and through his relational theory of the individual, then we 
arrive at the beginning of a truly Spinozian theory of art that considers each work of art in its 
individuality and through its capacity to have real effects in the world. Just as Spinoza notes of 
Scripture in the TTP that we should not look outside of its letter to legitimate its word, so it follows 
from his comments on art in the Ethics that we should not look to normative aesthetic standards 
that exist outside of the body of art in order to see how we ought to engage with art. Works of art, 
for Spinoza, should be taken in their materiality, as bodies amongst bodies, and they should not be 
measured through standards foreign to their body's immediate effects.  
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I hoped to have remedied the belief that Spinoza's philosophy is hostile to art and that 
his thought cannot provide us with various productive tools for thinking about art. I have argued that 
Spinoza gives us both a model through which to understand the creative act of the artist and a 
model through which we can theorise art objects and practices. Put reductively what I have argued 
for is Spinoza's naturalisation of the art object to the status of a complex body. The role of the artist 
relative to the creative act was identified, and the artist's intention was reduced to the complex 
necessity of extended substance and its infinite unfold-ing. This naturalisation of the creative act 
should come as no surprise to readers familiar with Spinoza's naturalistic project and critique of free 
will, and nor is such a position on the role of the artist relative to the creative act unprecedented in 
theories of artistic creation.26 But as well as this Spinoza also naturalises and reconceives the objects 
that follow from the body of the artist. It is true that art objects are treated as particularly complex 
and powerful bodies with the capacity to overcome complex affects such as melancholy, but they 
are nevertheless treated like every other body, having both a determinable causal history and a 
certain capacity to affect and be affected. It is in this sense that Spinoza's theory of the individual 
affords us a relational theory of art that situates the art object as a body amongst bodies and, 
ultimately, as a part within an always greater social whole. This latter position situates Spinoza's 
theory of art squarely on the historicist side of artistic enquiry. As the theory of the Spinozist 
individual goes, an understanding of any body includes, albeit at varying levels of adequacy, an 
understanding of a body's milieu and, in consequence, of the circumstances that brought it to be. In 
this way any adequate engagement with a particular artistic body elicits a degree of understanding 
of the wider site of its production-a knowledge of the greater, social individual of which the artistic 
body is a mere part. If art is to be considered as a part in a wider social-whole, then the next phase in 
thinking a Spinozist theory of art would be an exploration of this part-whole relation.27  
Contrary to the dismissal of Spinoza's philosophy as a barren soil for art and its theorisation, this 
paper has argued that there are in fact several reasons why one might turn to the Spinozist 
philosophy in order to think about art and its objects and practices.  
 
NOTES  
Thanks are due to the participants of the 2016 Spinoza Symposium at the University of Groningen 
who commented on an earlier version of this article. I would also like to thank Beth Lord for her 
invaluable input on various drafts of this article. 
1.  For work that deals with Spinoza and art directly, see Gatens 2012, 2013, 2015; Uhlmann 
2011; Mack 2012; and Morrison 1989.For more indirect work on Spinoza and art, see 
O'Sullivan 2006. 
2. For a similar argument, see Mack 2012. 
3. In the text, 1 use the standard reference for the Ethics, whereby IP12Dem denotes the 
Demonstration to Proposition 12 of Book 1. All references to Spinoza's Ethics are from 
Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, in Spinoza 1994. References to the Letters are from Ethics, 
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, and Selected Letters (Spinoza 1992), and 
referenced by their respective numbers, e.g., Letter 12 becomes Ep12. References to the 
Theological-Political Treatise are from Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Silverthorne and 
Israel (Spinoza 2007). 
4. This is not to say, however, that Spinoza doesn't often turn to the art of poetry to expand his 
own ideas, for instance his use of Ovid in IIIP3lCor and 1VPI7Schol, as well as his 
paraphrasing of "the tragedian" Seneca in TTP: 73. But his uses of the poets in these 
instances function only to illustrate his own philosophical ideas. and while this gives us an 
idea about the epistemological function Spinoza thought literature and art to have, it 
nevertheless remains to be an illustrative reference to art in the service of philosophy and 
not a consideration of art on its own terms. 
5. The theory of 'artistic genius' being most famously theorised in section 46 of Kant's Critique 
of Judgment. 
6. Once again Morrison takes as the standard to measure Spinoza's thoughts on art an 
aesthetics that post-dates his philosophy. Specifically Morrison, in dismissing Spinoza's 
thoughts on art via his philosophy's inability to afford to art objects an ontological excess, 
continues to read a Romantic, idealist condition of art as aesthetic back onto Spinoza's 
philosophy. On this conflation of art, the aesthetic, and the metaphysical autonomy of 
artworks in Romanticism, see Osborne 2004: 660-ln27. 
7. For instance, the Kantian aesthetic theory holds that art must be judged disinterestedly, that 
is, without relation to a work of art having a relation of utility to desires that are specifically 
related to the individual who experiences the work of art. See Critique of Judgment§2. 
8. Spinoza's theorization of the sacredness of Scripture will be returned to in Part 5. 
9. For a reading that emphasizes Spinoza's project of human realignment with nature and 
situates this project within a wider historical framework, see Mack 20 I 0. 
10. For Spinoza's uses of melancholy, see IIIPl1Schol, IJIDef3, IV Preface, IVP35Schol, IVP42, 
IVP45Schol, TPT 21, TPT 22. For an excellent cultural history of melancholy and its relation to 
philosophy, religion and art, see Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl's important study, Saturn and 
Melancholy (Klibansky, Panofsky, and Sax! 1964 ). For a more contemporary study that 
develops the cultural complexity of melancholy as a kind of assemblage, see Daniel 2013. 
11. In the Physical Digression, Spinoza uses composite body, complex body, and individual 
interchangeably. 
12. An account of individuation in Spinoza is one of the most problematic of interpretations of 
the Ethics. Curley notes that the physical digression leaves many important things 
unanswered (Curley 1988: 112), Deleuze notes that the problem of individu-ation poses 
many problems for Spinozism (Deleuze 1992: 194-5), Garrett states that the problem of 
individuation has been the object of much puzzlement (Garrett 1994: 73), while Melamed 
states that it is Spinoza's weak theory of the individual that leaves his philosophy open to the 
critique of Hegel whose criticism questions the reality of finite things (Melamed 201 O: 85). 
13. For excellent commentaries on the details and problems of Spinoza's theory of the 
individual, see Balibar I 997, Garrett 1994, and Sacksteder 1978. 
14. It is precisely this complexity of the human body that makes its idea-the human mind-also 
complex. Specifically, Genevieve Lloyd has remarked that given the complex structure of the 
human body, it is able to retain images or modifications of itself even in the absence of the 
affecting body (See Lloyd 1994: 45). This ability to remember, the capacity of memory, is a 
key factor in why human individuals are of greater complexity compared to many other 
individuals. However it is also this very capacity to remember that renders humans 
increasingly servile to negative affects, for even when the object of a negative affect is 
absent the human can still be affected by its image. Again this means that humans are at 
once more complex and affective but also more susceptible to sad affects and the 
diminution of power that follows. See IIPl 8Schol for Spinoza's words on memory. 
15. See also Sharp 2011: 98. 
16. See also Armstrong ( 2009: 54 ), who correlates the power of the Spinozian individual to its 
degree of sensitivity. 
17. Furthermore, and as Lebuffe remarks, Spinoza himself wavers on how exactly to fully explain 
such affects stating of melancholy and cheerfulness that they are "more easily conceived 
than observed" (IVP44Schol), a statement that appears deliberately ambiguous. 
See also IIP 18Schol for how words gain their meaning through the circulation of affects 
between bodies. 
19. For an excellent reading of the materiality of the Scriptural body, see Montag 1999: chap. 1, 
"Scripture and Nature: The Materiality of the Letter." 
20. See, respectively, Bali bar 1998, Balibar 1997, Armstrong 2009, and Williams 2012. 
21. For a similar argument, see Rosenthal 2008: 115-6. 
22. Alexandre Matheron determines this double aspect of the individual as, respectively, the 
'formal' and 'material' elements of the Spinozist individual (Matheron 1969: 38). 
23. For an excellent articulation of this tenet of Spinozism, see Genevieve Lloyd's discussion of 
the 'self' in Spinoza's philosophy. Specifically, see Lloyd 1996: 120. 
24. See Mack 2014: 52-73. 
25. Sec, specifically, Eco 1989: chaps. I, 4. 
26. See, for instance, section four of The Third Essay of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality 
(Nietzsche 1997: 71), as well as Marcel Duchamp's essay "The Creative Act'' (Du champ 1973: 138-
40) 
27. This might begin with a study of the 'historical method' of interpreting Scripture that Spinoza 
outlines in chapters 7-10 of the TTP. 
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